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“On a cold, wet, gusty day” in October 1862, William C. Corsan, a 
Sheffield steel merchant and manufacturer, arrived in New York on an 
investigative visit to war-torn America. The main object of  Corsan’s 
scrutiny was not, as might have been expected, the capitalist heart-
lands of  the northeast and middle states but the slave South, now 
fighting for its independence in a life-and-death struggle whose human 
and material costs were already massively in evidence.1
Corsan’s itinerary took him first by steamship to New Orleans, now 
reclaimed to Federal authority, and thence into the Confederacy itself. 
As he penetrated deeper into the new republic, the Sheffield man found 
increasing evidence of  its ability to sustain its independence. Every-
where he noted “an enormous superabundance” of  the “necessaries of  
Southern life” such as corn, wheat, pork, beef, sweet potatoes, rice, 
sugar, molasses and poultry. He was equally impressed by the South’s 
manufacturing potential, now being harnessed to both domestic and 
military need. Across a range of  commodities, from shoes to artillery 
shells, agrarian Southerners appeared to have thrown off  their ante-
bellum inhibitions, and driven by necessity, were well on the way to 
achieving economic self-sufficiency. “Everybody seemed agreed,” 
 Corsan wrote, “that the activity, ingenuity, and energy which were 
now being directed towards developing the resources of  the South were 
of  recent growth, and dated their rise from the time when, about the 
spring of  1862, their last hope of  foreign recognition died out.  .  . . Then 
it was that they resolved to see what they could do to help them-
selves.”2 
William Corsan’s point that the South only came to realize the need 
to develop its internal resources after the hope of  foreign recognition 
was extinguished (oddly dated as the spring of  1862), if  true, suggests 
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both the Confederacy’s ill-preparedness and the importance it placed 
upon external assistance in achieving its independence aims. Yet how 
seriously did Southerners believe in the efficacy of  foreign help? The 
question remains an awkward one, the evidence muddling. Corsan 
himself  at one point was “surprised to find so little interest taken in 
the question, as to whether England and France would interfere or 
offer mediation” in the American quarrel, yet observed that Southern 
newspapers “invariably published every scrap of  news bearing upon 
the issue.”3 Chatting with members of  General Earl Van Dorn’s staff  
at Abbeville, Mississippi in November 1862, another English visitor 
found them to be “rather sore” at Europe’s refusal to recognize the 
Confederacy, especially since, as they put it, “the South American 
republics had been recognized far more quickly.” On the other hand, 
Henry C. Fletcher noted that the men also acknowledged that “at the 
commencement of  the war, they had looked too much for external as-
sistance,” and were now “resolved to trust to themselves.”4
I want briefly here to re-examine the South’s expectations of  
 European assistance, particularly in regard to Great Britain, with 
whom slaveholders were in a complex and contradictory relationship. 
Nothing better embodies the failure of  the slaveholders’ ill-prepared 
bid for independence than the disparity between the expectations of  
British (and French) support and the support that was ultimately 
received from across the Atlantic. So much of  the focus of  this period 
has been on how close Britain was to intervening in the America war; 
too little notice has been taken of  the slaveholders’ resentment when 
such intervention did not materialize. The South’s frustration at the 
failure of  Britain and other European powers to recognize its inde-
pendence bred a deep resentment that resulted, among other actions, 
in the expulsion in 1863 of  all British consuls from the Confederacy. 
The English have taken merely a “spoiling interest” in the American 
conflict, lamented the South’s leading propagandist in Europe, and 
have not woken up to the “universal issues of  moral right, national 
liberty, humanity and civilization involved.”5
The expectations that both Northerners and Southerners held 
about foreign support were crucial to determining their respective 
responses to the war’s international outcomes. Northern expectations 
were based on a powerful cocktail of  legal, political and moral factors, 
one of  which, the appeal to Europe’s antislavery conscience, was ini-
tially undermined by the Lincoln government’s repeated assertion 
that it was not fighting an abolition war. But what of  the South? As 
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Southern leaders viewed the prospect, the Confederate States had an 
even greater claim to foreign support than its Federal foe on the basis 
of  its legitimacy. Secession had been a lawful act, they insisted, involv-
ing a resumption of  original state sovereignty prior to organization 
into a new confederation. In his founding speeches, the new president, 
Jefferson Davis, went out of  his way to affirm that the Confederacy 
did not derive from a revolutionary opposition to establish authority 
but was in fact a counter-revolution forced on Southerners by the 
tyrannical actions of  an abolitionized North. Secession thus met 
American constitutional tests and Southerners were fully justified in 
demanding that foreign powers acknowledge, support and recognize 
the Confederate States as a legitimately-constituted nation. Moreover, 
Southerners were a distinct people, not only legally required to de-
mand independence but also culturally entitled to do so. After all, had 
not Britain supported self-determination in Europe and in Latin 
America? Why would it hesitate to do so now? 
The flaws in the North’s appeal for foreign assistance largely arose 
from the concrete political dilemmas the Federal republic faced as a 
result of  disunion. But when we turn to the South’s expectations, we 
see a different kind of  failure – less pragmatic, more rooted in the slave 
South’s fundamental shortcomings as a society. Arguments based on 
principles of  legitimacy and self-determination might have struck a 
chord across the Atlantic had they been consistently pursued, even 
though, to be honest, their acceptance would ultimately depend on 
Confederate success on the battlefield – and that did not happen. 
 Instead, the architects of  Southern independence chose to rely on an 
idea that, as the late Peter Parish noted many years ago, masquer-
aded as a policy: King Cotton.6
It is hard to overestimate the extent to which Southerners initially 
believed that King Cotton could fix everything. As a writer in DeBow’s 
Review, the leading Southern commercial periodical, put it in 1859, “In 
cotton, [the South] possesses a weapon more formidable than all the 
inventions of  modern warfare. England will ever be held in check by 
this model king; for she dare not risk revolution at home, by depriving 
millions of  the people of  their support.”7 Extreme confidence in King 
Cotton even spilled over to those who represented areas not dependent 
upon the staple. Addressing the US Senate in February 1861, the 
western North Carolinian Thomas Clingman boasted: “Alexander 
claimed to have conquered the world; but his dominions were confined 
to Asia and the territories on the shores of  the Bosphorus. Julius Cae-
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sar, a still mightier monarch, ruled only on the eastern continent. King 
Cotton governs two hemispheres, and dominates on land and sea, and 
the kings of  the east and the merchant princes of  the west obey his 
bidding.”8
The extent of  King Cotton’s grip upon the Southern political im-
agination is confirmed by the fact that those initially opposed to seces-
sion also used it to further their arguments during the critical months 
leading up to the outbreak of  the war. Addressing his state’s General 
Assembly in November 1860, the Georgia cooperationist, and future 
Confederate Senator Benjamin Hill, noted that antislavery sentiment 
in Britain did not derive from fanaticism or philanthropy but “cupid-
ity.” Having failed to see off  its great competitor, first through the 
abolition of  slavery in the West Indies which it hoped might effect a 
similar crippling of  production on the mainland, and then through the 
unsuccessful attempt to raise cotton in India, Britain had now become 
“the defender of  slavery in the South.” “She must have cotton,” Hill 
insisted. “Four millions of  people can’t live without it. It must come 
from the Southern states.”9
So here we have it. As the South’s leadership understood it, the 
Confederate States, through lawful political establishment, had al-
ready met the prime condition for international recognition. But, 
above all, the British especially would have little choice but to recog-
nize – and actively intervene to support the independence of  – the new 
republic, for if  not, they would soon be brought to their knees by the 
inexorable power of  King Cotton. Without American cotton, which in 
the late 1850s constituted between 60 and 82 percent of  the total 
value of  American imports into Britain and upon which an estimated 
20 percent of  the British population directly or indirectly depended 
for its livelihood, the South believed British looms would stand idle, 
with the resulting unemployment eventually inducing social revolu-
tion. But Southerners also believed that before such a crisis was 
reached, the British government would intervene to secure the cotton 
supply and prevent national catastrophe. 
As historians have long acknowledged, King Cotton diplomacy was 
deeply flawed in theory, practice and, crucially, timing.10 Cotton stocks 
in Britain and France at the outset of  the war had never been higher 
– the Southern planters were victims of  their own success, with the 
1859 crop being especially bountiful. Moreover, Southerners did not 
have a monopoly of  supply; and throughout the antebellum period 
Britain had taken steps, albeit inadequate ones, to ensure the availabil-
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ity of  other sources, notably in India. The South’s naivety in relation 
to its most prized asset was evident from the outset of  the new repub-
lic. At the end of  February 1861 the Confederate Congress passed an 
export tariff  of  one-eighth of  a cent a pound on raw cotton. This ac-
tion not only undermined the tactical advantage Southerners had 
gained following the passage by the Federal Congress of  the highly 
protectionist Morrill Tariff  a week earlier but also, in transatlantic 
eyes, committed them to what a leading London newspaper called 
“that most deplorable of  all economic absurdities, an export duty on 
an article of  produce of  which the State has no monopoly.”11
In essence, the cotton policy amounted to economic blackmail: un-
less you recognize us, we will deprive you of  this essential commodity. 
Arguments over the Federal blockade were particularly revealing of  
the policy’s shortcomings. Southern diplomats were required to pro-
test that Lincoln’s blockade of  the Southern coastline was ineffective 
– a ‘paper’ blockade and thus illegal under international law. But in 
order for the argument to be accepted, they had to explain why, if  the 
blockade was so ineffective, so porous, cotton supplies were not getting 
through. The answers they gave usually referred to the limited size 
and availability of  the Confederate merchant marine, but the real 
reason was that Southern planter leaders had imposed an embargo on 
cotton’s export – an action that extended to the burning of  thousands 
of  bales – in an attempt to put pressure on Britain and France.12 Sub-
sequently, the cotton card was played more intelligently, but in the 
crucial first two years of  the conflict, when Confederate military suc-
cess was still possible, the attempt to force European compliance was 
bound to fail. Experienced mid-Victorian statesmen such as Palmer-
ston and Lord John Russell were unlikely to respond favourably to 
such crude arm-twisting, while the assumption that British foreign 
policy would or could be determined solely by economic considerations 
was equally anathema.
Other aspects of  Confederate foreign relations contributed to the 
failure to achieve recognition – including perhaps its choice of  diplo-
mats – but the over-reliance on cotton for diplomatic leverage, the 
deeply flawed belief  in its majesty, was surely the most serious. Political 
naivety aside, the point here is that the Anglo-American economic 
relationship in the years leading up to the Civil War was far more 
complex than Southern planter leaders ever understood or bothered 
to ascertain. Obviously, cotton dominated trade between the two 
countries, but, for example, the role of  American farmers in feeding 
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Britain’s burgeoning population should not be underestimated. After 
1846 the U.S. became the major foreign provider of  grain and flour, 
and generally between 1854 and 1861 well over half, and, in some com-
modities, over three quarters of  British imports of  essentials such as 
bacon, beef, lard and pork came from that source. And it almost goes 
without saying that the vast majority of  this produce originated 
in the free states.13 Add to that the extent and complexities of  the 
British export trade, the vital contribution of  capital and technology 
flows, and we have an Anglo-American economy far removed from the 
facile portrait painted by Southerners. Moreover, for every area like 
Lancashire, home of  the cotton textile industry, where pressure to 
recognize the South’s independence might have developed, there were 
others – Birmingham, with its arms manufacturing is a good example 
– where a different scenario prevailed. Finally, far more influential still 
than either Lancashire textile workers or Birmingham arms makers in 
dictating British responses to the war were arguably Anglo-American 
bankers such as the Barings, the Rothschilds and the Peabodys, re-
cently investigated by Jay Sexton, whose investment in the emergent 
capitalist order of  the northeastern United States strongly predisposed 
them, all other things being equal, to favour a Union victory.14
By failing to establish a coherent strategy, other than the crudely 
coercive one, for utilizing its most precious commodity, the Southern 
planter leadership revealed how little it understood – or indeed cared 
about – the dynamics and obligations of  international reciprocity. 
How do we explain these general shortcomings? Most explanations for 
the British failure to intervene on the Confederacy’s side downplay the 
extent to which the slave South – which in the late eighteenth century 
and early nineteenth century had played a conspicuous role in the 
transatlantic community – had become alienated from the main land-
scape of  Anglo-American commerce, culture and belief. Diplomacy 
and foreign relations do not operate in a vacuum. When diplomats 
present arguments to a foreign government, the points raised are 
validated or subverted by the layers of  interest and the value systems 
that underpin the relationship between the respective societies. And 
in my view, the interest and the values underpinning the South’s argu-
ment for British recognition were both few and shallow – especially 
when compared to those connecting Britain to the free states in this 
period.
We know how much Southern cotton was sent to these shores but 
know far less about how many Southerners were active participants 
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in the transatlantic networks upon which the cotton trade relied. Even 
the most cursory glance confirms how un-networked the slave South 
was before the Civil War. How many influential Southerners had vis-
ited Britain, for example, or were in regular communication with lead-
ing economic, political or intellectual figures on this side of  the Atlan-
tic? In his recent Conjectures of  Order, Michael O’Brien is seemingly 
impressed with the extent of  the antebellum Southern intellectual 
elite’s direct familiarity with Europe but in truth his list is a thin one, 
particularly when he reveals those among the intelligensia – he guess-
es “perhaps half” – who never left the United States, including such 
luminaries as John C. Calhoun, Edmund Ruffin, George Fitzhugh and 
Paul Hamilton Hayne.15 Among leading Southern political figures, the 
list of  those with direct experience of  Europe is even skinnier, al-
though two of  the three occupants of  the Confederate State Depart-
ment had crossed the Atlantic prior to secession. Robert Toombs, the 
first and worst Secretary of  State, visited London and Paris on a shop-
ping and sightseeing visit in 1855; the transatlantic visits of  the far 
more able Judah P. Benjamin, on the other hand, were dictated by his 
need to see his wife and daughter who were domiciled in Paris. 
Direct experience of  Europe was also limited among much of  the 
Federal leadership, yet in Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner, 
chairman of  the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and his former 
colleague in the upper house, William H. Seward, the Secretary of  
State, the Union possessed two men whose internationalism far ex-
ceeded anything the South could muster. Sumner’s relationship with 
leading British liberals is well known; less accepted is Seward’s trans-
atlantic engagement. Although the wily New Yorker delighted in 
tweaking John Bull’s tail, and in early 1861 even suggested provoking 
a foreign war as a means of  deflecting secession, he was by any yard-
stick an Anglophile. Seward had made two extended visits across the 
Atlantic by the time he assumed office, kept in touch with British 
friends via correspondence, and was a strong advocate of  the Atlantic 
telegraph which he saw as vitally important to fostering Anglo-Amer-
ican friendship.16 There were Southerners, such as the influential New 
Orleans editor James DeBow, who advocated stronger links with Eu-
rope, and at the various commercial conventions during the 1840s and 
50s there was a lot of  huffing and puffing about the need for direct 
steamship routes to help circumvent the North’s commercial domi-
nance.17 But nothing came of  it, and as the dogs of  secession yelped 
ever louder, the poverty of  the slave South’s internationalism was 
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strikingly revealed. Independence not interdependence was now the 
planters’ unceasing cry.
By neglecting the main transatlantic networks, Southerners ensured 
that independence effectively meant isolation from the dynamic devel-
opments that were transforming the Atlantic world. Despite the power-
ful commercial ties linking Britain and the South, a glance through any 
mid-century British newspaper will confirm how underrepresented the 
slave states had become in the Anglo-American information system, 
with editors overwhelmingly relying on Northern copy for their Amer-
ican news. This information failure reflected the character of  Southern 
society at large. Through the nineteenth century Southern develop-
ment lagged behind that of  every other part of  the United States. With 
a third of  the population in 1860, Southerners could muster up only 
10 percent of  the nation’s manufacturing labour force and only 11 
percent of  its manufacturing capital, trailing not only New England 
and the Mid-Atlantic states but also the Midwest which started much 
later. Quantitatively deficient, the South was also qualitatively at odds 
with the vigorous entrepreneurial culture of  the Mid-Atlantic area 
where the dynamic mesh of  information, capital and technology was 
producing startling results. “Leveraging their transatlantic contacts 
and networks with resources of  their own,” writes Peter Coclanis, “mer-
chants and manufacturers in the Northeast were able by the 1850s to 
establish the foundations – economic, social, political, institutional, and 
cultural – for a modern urban, industrial society.”18
Thus in erecting a cultural and intellectual wall around themselves 
to prevent infection from free-state ideas, slaveholders simultaneously 
created a barrier between themselves and Europe. And not surpris-
ingly, isolation bred suspicion and hostility to anything and everything 
that seemed to challenge the values of  the slave society. Fear of  abo-
litionism, for example, strongly shaped Southern attitudes towards 
Europe’s revolutionary upheavals. Always concerned with the implica-
tions for slavery, writes Joseph Fry, Southerners “particularly ab-
horred establishing any precedent for interference in the internal 
 affairs of  another country or for endorsing radical actions that over-
threw established governments and placed morality over legal order.”19 
Nowhere is this anxiety over the security of  slave society better 
 revealed than in the rampant Anglophobia embraced by so many 
Southerners in the two decades before the Civil War – those same 
Southerners, we must remind ourselves, who in 1861 now insisted that 
Britain support them in their independence struggle.
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Anglophobia was widespread in pre-Civil War America but it was 
in the slave South where hostility to Britain raged most consistently 
and fiercely. To the general fears that Britain continued to seek if  not 
the destruction at least the curtailment of  the American democratic 
experiment, Southerners added the extra ingredient of  abolitionism. 
During the 1840s Southern politics became infected with virulent 
Anglophobic rhetoric, as slaveholding politicians, headed by John C. 
Calhoun, the pre-eminent political and intellectual defender of  slave 
society, raised the spectre of  British designs on the then independent 
republic of  Texas. Writing to the British Minister Sir Richard Paken-
ham, in April 1844, Calhoun, then briefly serving as Secretary of  State, 
interpreted the official British ambition of  seeking the general aboli-
tion of  slavery throughout the world “as a direct threat to the United 
States.” Calhoun added in the process a detailed lecture on the advan-
tages of  slavery to both the black and white races. To this abolition 
conspiracy argument, Southerners further charged Britain with seek-
ing to destroy the United States as a commercial rival by extending 
its cotton production into Texas.20
Southerners defeated the dastardly British plot by the simple ex-
pedient of  annexing Texas to the U.S. in 1845, thus expanding their 
own slaveholding domain – which of  course is what the whole issue 
had been about in the first place. Calhoun himself  died in 1850 but his 
shadow was long, and as the sectional crisis reached its climax at the 
end of  the decade, it is hardly a shock to see Anglophobia again rear-
ing its head. In speeches, pamphlets and letters, Britain was demon-
ised as “the mother of  Abolitionism” in the words of  one Georgia 
newspaper in December 1860.21 The difference was that Southerners 
now needed to combine anti-British tirades with an explanation of  
why these same wicked British should now support them in their fight 
for nationhood.
Southern views of  Britain and the British lacked consistency and 
sometimes reality. Members of  the South’s governing class often liked 
to imagine an identity of  interest between themselves and the English 
gentry, claiming descent from ‘cavalier’ society, and professed to be 
repelled by industrialization and the miseries experienced, for exam-
ple, by Lancashire mill workers. Yet the whole theory of  King Cotton 
required the continued expansion of  British industry. If  demand for 
cotton slackened, the South’s economy and with it the social, political, 
and racial authority of  slaveholders, would be eroded.22 In truth, what 
offended Calhoun and other planter spokesmen was not British com-
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mercial policy per se, nor any real fear that the British were about to 
reduce mankind, Americans included, to economic vassalage, but Brit-
ain’s emergence as a leading antislavery power.
So, by the beginning of  the 1860s, as the cotton states finally made 
good their threat to leave the Union, we see Southerners sharpening 
their view of  Britain as a nation and a people whose impulses and 
interests were predominantly antagonistic to their own. It was hardly 
a recipe for transatlantic mutuality. In their official discourse, the 
South’s leaders often spoke the language of  shared interest. But 
scratch beneath the surface, you will find a far more uninhibited ex-
pression of  slaveholding resentment towards “monarchical” Britain 
(and to a lesser extent France) and a deep disdain for international 
interdependence. Here’s the ex-Federal and future Confederate con-
gressman William Russell Smith of  Tuscaloosa, Alabama, addressing 
his state’s secession convention in January 1861:
We must not depend on foreign alliances. Our institutions are too essentially dif-
ferent from theirs. They will always demand more than they give. They surrender 
shadows and demand substances .  .  . England will never forget her colonies. The 
gap in her crown, caused by the tearing away of  those jewels, has not yet been 
filled. It is the dream of  her political philosophy to see those jewels restored; and 
English pride, with English ambition, is far-reaching. Her revenge is as deathless 
as the oath of  Hannibal .  .  . Let us beware, then, of  foreign friends. England has 
no feelings in common with us. Her politicians are emancipationists.23
In the view of  many in the South on the eve of  the Civil War, therefore, 
Britain represented everything that was antithetical to the values and 
institutions of  a free, democratic, slave society. Although, as noted, 
the Confederate leadership was more circumspect in its language than 
Mr. Smith, the underlying belief  that the South neither required – nor 
morally could justify entering into – alliances with countries so alien 
to its values served to weaken its efforts at acquiring international 
status. Recognition became an end in itself, a form of  validation, 
rather than a genuine application for membership in international 
society, with all its rights, obligations, and, vital to the Confederacy’s 
survival, its practical benefits. And there’s no better representative of  
the South’s deeply flawed internationalism than the head man himself. 
President Jefferson Davis, the arch-expansionist, appears to have had 
only limited understanding or interest in foreign affairs. Even Davis’s 
most sympathetic modern biographer admits that the South’s elected 
leader had a “provincial view of  the world,” and that he “simply 
couldn’t understand why European nations .  .  . consulted their own 
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national interests in dealing with the recently emerged Confederate 
States of  America.”24
William Corsan’s surprise at finding in the South, as he put it, “so 
little interest” in the question of  transatlantic intervention in the 
sectional war, should not therefore, in hindsight, completely surprise 
us. By the early 1860s leading Southerners viewed Britain as selfish, 
corrupt and acutely hostile to the interests and aspirations of  a slave-
holding society – a virtually identical view to the one Southerners held 
of  their enemy to the north. “We never expected England to interfere, 
and do not now expect her,” Corsan’s Confederate hosts continued.
We quite understand the policy of  the Government of  such a country as England. 
Yours is a rich aristocratic country, and you can afford to keep the poor caused 
by the Cotton Famine for twenty years, if  necessary, if  at the end of  that time 
you shall have made yourselves independent of  the world for cotton, and such 
discredit has been thrown on republican institutions by our ruin, as to render their 
rise for another century impossible. We believe the people of  England is [sic] with 
us: but your aristocracy, which hates a democracy; your capitalists, who hold the 
United States and Northern stocks; your Manchester men, who are making mon-
ey out of  their stock of  manufactured and raw cotton; your Sheffield men, who 
are selling steel to the Northern Government; your Birmingham men, who are 
selling rifles, swords and bayonets; your Huddersfield, Leeds, &c. men who are 
selling shoddy clothes; and your shipowners, into whose hands our Alabamas, &c. 
are throwing all the carrying-trade of  the world––all these classes, who are all 
powerful in England, are against us, and want the war to go on. But we shall win 
nevertheless, and some of  your greedy people wont make much in the long run, 
either, by their conduct.25
Finally, it is necessary to add one final ingredient to my argument that 
the slave South was fundamentally at odds with the world from which 
in 1861 it now demanded support. Nothing more points up the South’s 
alienation from modernity than its failure to participate in the mass 
migrations that were transforming the rest of  the United States in the 
middle decades of  the nineteenth century. A basic overview demon-
strating the pattern of  English settlement before the Civil War shows 
that not only was the South attracting a small minority of  English 
emigrants, but the gap between the slave and free states was widening 
in the decade before the Civil War, as the South was rapidly overtaken 
by the new states to the west (see appendix). “If  I were a young man 
I would sever myself  from the old world and plant myself  in the west-
ern region of  the United States,” concluded Richard Cobden in 1859, 
and clearly thousands were following his advice.26 
Cultural and Capital Exchange466
It was not only the English who were avoiding the slave South. If  
we look at foreign-born residents, we can see how severely limited im-
migration had been into the eleven future states of  the Confederacy, 
with only Louisiana and Texas registering significant percentages. By 
contrast, the free states revealed a radically altered ethnic landscape, 
with immigration here providing the engine for economic and social 
development. The white South, so confident in its future, was demo-
graphically stagnating – at least in terms of  the element that had 
historically played such a vital role in American expansion and renewal: 
foreign immigration. 
The relative lack of  ethnic diversity resulting from its failure to 
attract foreign immigrants reinforced the slave South’s political, intel-
lectual and racial conservatism. Yet, ironically, that is not the way 
that Southerners themselves saw it. Countless Southerners celebrated 
the idea that the region had escaped the effects of  “mongrelization” 
brought on by foreign influx, effects, they claimed, that were in part 
responsible for the free states’ decline into corruption and now tyr-
anny. In his inaugural address, Jefferson Davis waxed lyrical about 
the “homogeneity” of  the South, ironic again in the uniquely bi-racial 
society he had been elected to lead.27 “Perhaps the strongest feeling in 
the South,” William Corsan wrote at the end of  his 1862 Confederate 
sojourn, “is that directed against the naturalization of  foreigners 
as citizens. To the influx at the north of  uneducated masses, satu-
rated with political fallacies and crotchets, who at once acquired the 
power of  voting, and, consequently, great weight to the State – to this 
chiefly do Southern people attribute the steady deterioration in 
 political virtue which, they say, has been going on at the North for 
years.”28 
The failure of  the slave states to attract English and other Euro-
pean immigrants had consequences which go well beyond the scope of  
this discussion. But in my view it offers final verification of  the white 
South’s self-imposed estrangement from an Atlantic community into 
which it now demanded entry as a sovereign, independent nation. By 
1861 economic and political momentum belonged not to Old South 
agrarianism – and even less to the immoral and anachronistic labour 
system that sustained it – but to its antithesis, what we might tenta-
tively call “New Britain”: the vibrant, interdependent, urban-indus-
trial nexus of  the northern North Atlantic. In a recent study of  
Louisiana, Richard Follett has noted how “the social ethic of  southern 
slaveholding undermined the planters’ capacity to cooperate and com-
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pete in the increasingly competitive domestic market.”29 Follett’s 
 description of  planters obsessed with personal autonomy and passion-
ately ill-disposed to cede their independence to anyone or to any group 
may also help us understand the Confederacy’s failure to achieve its 
international goals. For, if  William Corsan’s testimony is accurate, 
Southerners not only never believed that Britain would freely support 
its independence bid nor, if  truth be known, did they care whether it 
did or not. Throughout the secession and Confederate period, the 
South’s planter leaders betrayed a striking ambivalence towards – if  
not at times a manifest contempt for – the relationships that they 
should have been so concerned to nurture. And it is not surprising, 
therefore, that they should have so conspicuously failed to persuade 
the wider world, Britain in particular, to support them in their hour 
of  need.
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were living or dead, and solvent or ruined. My intention was, if  possible, to pen-
etrate into and travel over the Confederate States, in pursuit of  this perfectly 
innocent inquiry” (5).
2 Ibid. 129.
3 Ibid. 92.
4 [Fletcher], “A Run through the Southern States” 501.
5 Henry Hotze, “To Judah P. Benjamin,” 27 August 1863, quoted in Crawford, The 
Anglo-American Crisis of  the Mid-Nineteenth Century 5.
6 Parish, The American Civil War 397.
7 Smith, “A Southern Confederacy” 578.
8 Thomas Clingman, “Speech on the State of  the Union, Delivered to the Senate of  
the United States, February 4, 1861,” Southern Pamphlets on Secession, ed. Wake-
lyn 285.
9 Freehling and Simpson, Secession Debated 91-92.
10 Scholarly evaluation of  the Confederacy’s diplomatic record began with Calla-
ghan, Diplomatic History and achieved maturity with Owsley, King Cotton Diplo-
macy, first published in 1931 and updated in 1959. Owsley’s research and insights 
have been supplemented (though not fully supplanted) by numerous studies, the 
most significant of  which, in order of  publication, are: Jordan and Pratt, Europe 
and the American Civil War; Blumenthal, “Confederate Diplomacy”; Cullop, Con-
federate Propaganda; Jenkins, Britain and the War for the Union; Ball, Financial 
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Failure and Confederate Defeat; Hubbard, The Burden of  Confederate Diplomacy; 
and Sexton, Debtor Diplomacy.
11 Crawford, The Anglo-American Crisis of  the Mid-Nineteenth Century 97.
12 Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy 24-49.
13 Potter, “Atlantic Economy” 245-52.
14 See Sexton, Debtor Diplomacy.
15 O’Brien, Conjectures of  Order 100.
16 See Van Deusen, William Henry Seward 22-23, 182, 211-12, 292-93. The contrasting 
character and outlook of  the two societies is also revealed in the choice of  diplo-
matic representatives: the Confederacy’s principal envoy to Britain, Senator James 
M. Mason of  Virginia, and his Federal counterpart, Charles Francis Adams of  
Massachusetts. Although in part chosen because of  his service as chairman of  the 
Foreign Relations Committee, Mason was far better known across the Atlantic 
as the author of  the Fugitive Slave Act, the provisions of  which had shocked 
even the most hardened British observers. In 1858 Mason had turned down 
the opportunity to serve as the United States’ representative in London. (See 
Young, Senator James Murray Mason 111). Charles Francis Adams, the son 
and grandson of  presidents, had strong international credentials, beginning with 
childhood during which he spent six years in St Petersburg and a further two years 
in England while his father served as American minister to Russia and Great 
Britain respectively. As Martin Duberman writes, “John Quincy [Charles Francis 
Adams’ father] expected his children to play a large part on the world stage, as-
suming this to be the proper role for an Adams” (Duberman, Charles Francis 
Adams 11).
17 On antebellum conventions, see Johnson, The Men and the Vision 15-165. 
18 Coclanis, “Tracking the Economic Divergence of  North and South” 94.
19 Fry, Dixie Looks Abroad 67.
20 Haynes, “Anglophobia and the Annexation of  Texas” 130. See also Fry, Dixie 
Looks Abroad 56-57. It is worth noting that one of  the antebellum period’s best 
known non-slave state Anglophobic politicians, Lewis Cass of  Michigan, was also 
one of  its leading “doughfaces,” Northern men with Southern principles. See 
 Richards, The Slave Power 162-63.
21 The Daily Constitutionalist (Augusta), December 1, 1860, Southern Editorials on 
Secession, ed. Dumond 284.
22 The point is effectively argued in Brock, “The Image of  England and American 
Nationalism” 228.
23 William Russell Smith, The History and Debates 350-51.
24 Eaton, Jefferson Davis 164. The three most recent biographies of  the Confederate 
leader, by William C. Davis, William J. Cooper, Jr., and Herman Hattaway and 
Richard E. Beringer, if  only by dint of  the very small amount of  space devoted 
to the subject, appear to confirm Davis’ lack of  interest in foreign affairs.
25 Corsan, Two Months in the Confederate States 93.
26 Quoted in Richards, Britannia’s Children 162. 
27 Richardson, Messages and Papers 1: 35.
28 Corsan, Two Months in the Confederate States 93. For a recent view of  Southern 
ethnicity that points up the heterogeneity of  its population, see O’Brien, “After-
ward” 222.
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29 Follett, “‘Give to the Labor of  America, the Market of  America’” 121. See also 
Follett, Sugar Masters.
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APPENDIX
U.S. EngliSh-born popUlation by SECtion, 1850, 1860 
North South West
1850 100 88.1 7.0 4.9
1860 100 82.0 6.6 11.4
Total enumerated: 1850: 278, 675; 1860: 431, 692
U.S. forEign-born popUlation by StatE, 1850, 1860 (pErCEntagE) 
1850 1860 1850 1860
Alabama  1.0  1.3 California 23.5 38.6
Arkansas  0.7  0.8 Connecticut 10.4 17.5
Florida  3.2  2.4 Illinois 13.1 19.0
Georgia  0.7  1.1 Iowa 10.9 15.7
Louisiana 13.2 11.4 Maine  5.5  6.0
Mississippi  0.8  1.1 Massachusetts 16.5 21.1
N. Carolina  0.3  0.3 New York 21.2 25.8
S. Carolina  1.3  1.4 Pennsylvania 13.1 14.8
Tennessee  0.6  1.9 Wisconsin 36.2 35.7
Texas  8.3  7.2
Virginia  1.6  2.2
Source: <http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation>.

